

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

My Daily Choice, Inc.,  Plaintiff  v.  William Butler, Kristen Butler, & Arieyl, LLC,  Defendants	Case No.: 2:20-cv-02178-JAD-NJK  <b>Order Scheduling Hearing Re: Motion to Dismiss and Consolidation</b>  [ECF No. 23]
My Daily Choice, Inc.,  Plaintiff  v.  Marissa Brooke Donnell,  Defendant	Case No.: 2:20-cv-02225-JAD-NJK  <b>Order Scheduling Hearing Re: Motion to Dismiss and Consolidation</b>  [ECF No. 13]
My Daily Choice, Inc.,  Plaintiff  v.  Skylar Lambert,  Defendant	Case No.: 2:20-cv-02228-JAD-NJK  <b>Order Scheduling Hearing Re: Motion to Dismiss and Consolidation</b>  [ECF No. 17]
My Daily Choice, Inc.,  Plaintiff  v.  Danielle Lituski & Chad Lituski,  Defendants	Case No.: 2:20-cv-02232-JAD-NJK  <b>Order Scheduling Hearing Re: Motion to Dismiss and Consolidation</b>  [ECF No. 11]

1 My Daily Choice, Inc.,

2 Plaintiff

3 v.

4 Erin Jackson,

5 Defendant

Case No.: 2:20-cv-02237-JAD-NJK

**Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and  
Closing Case**

[ECF No. 5]

6 My Daily Choice, Inc. filed five separate lawsuits against its former affiliates William  
7 and Kristen Butler, Marissa Donnell, Skylar Lambert, Danielle and Chad Lituski, and Erin  
8 Jackson for breach of contract, copyright infringement, tortious interference, and fraud, alleging  
9 that they unlawfully launched a competing company, defendant Arieyl, LLC.<sup>1</sup> Arieyl, the  
10 Butlers, Donnell, Lambert, and the Lituskis argue that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over  
11 them because they have no contacts with Nevada and their contracts with My Daily Choice,  
12 which contain identical Nevada forum-selection clauses, are unenforceable because they were  
13 imposed under economic duress.<sup>2</sup> Jackson separately moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter  
14 jurisdiction, presenting evidence that the company cannot exceed the \$75,000 statutory minimum  
15 to maintain federal diversity jurisdiction over the suit against her.<sup>3</sup> I find that this court lacks  
16 subject-matter jurisdiction over Jackson, but that factual disputes remain about whether the  
17 forum-selection clause was the product of unfair pressure. I also find that this matter may be

19 <sup>1</sup> *My Daily Choice v. Butler*, case no. 2:20-cv-02178 (*Butler*), ECF No. 1 (complaint); *My Daily*  
20 *Choice v. Donnell*, case no. 2:20-cv-02225 (*Donnell*), ECF No. 1 (complaint); *My Daily Choice*  
21 *v. Lambert*, case no. 2:20-cv-02228 (*Lambert*), ECF No. 1 (complaint); *My Daily Choice v.*  
22 *Lituski*, case no. 2:20-cv-02232 (*Lituski*), ECF No. 1 (complaint); *My Daily Choice v. Jackson*,  
case no.: 2:20-cv-02237 (*Jackson*), ECF No. 1 (complaint). Allegations or arguments applicable  
to all parties are identified by reference to the documents filed in *Butler*.

23 <sup>2</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 23 (motion to dismiss); *Donnell*, ECF No. 13 (motion to dismiss); *Lambert*,  
ECF No. 17 (motion to dismiss); *Lituski*, ECF No. 11 (motion to dismiss).

<sup>3</sup> *Jackson*, ECF No. 5 (motion to dismiss).

1 facilitated by consolidation (given that My Daily Choice’s claims and allegations are largely  
2 identical for each defendant), but it is unclear whether consolidation may pose issues of  
3 convenience or prejudice. So I grant Jackson’s motion and dismiss the suit against her, and I  
4 order My Daily Choice and the remaining defendants to appear for a hearing about economic  
5 duress and consolidation.

#### 6 **Background**<sup>4</sup>

7 My Daily Choice is a direct-sales company that relies on independent affiliates to market  
8 and sell its hemp-based products.<sup>5</sup> Pyramidal in structure, the company’s affiliates earn revenue  
9 by selling merchandise, and they aspire to manage a team of “downline” recruits from whom  
10 they may take a percentage of sales profits.<sup>6</sup> According to the company, this compensation plan  
11 is unique and subject to copyright.<sup>7</sup> To become an affiliate, My Daily Choice requires its users  
12 to complete an affiliate application and agreement, which incorporates a variety of policies and  
13 procedures outlining the company’s terms and conditions. These conditions include: (1) a  
14 prohibition on cross-recruiting, which disallows managing affiliates to poach downline affiliates  
15 already involved with My Daily Choice; (2) various non-compete provisions, prohibiting the sale  
16 of competing products or affiliation with competing programs; (3) non-disparagement; and (4) in  
17 the case of a terminated relationship, a year-long prohibition on the use of social-media pages  
18 used to promote or sell My Daily Choice’s products.<sup>8</sup>

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20 <sup>4</sup> Aside from jurisdictional facts provided by the parties, this is merely a summary of the  
21 complaints’ allegations and should not be construed as findings of fact.

22 <sup>5</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 7–8.

23 <sup>6</sup> *Id.* at ¶ 8.

<sup>7</sup> *Id.* at ¶¶ 16, 20–22.

<sup>8</sup> *Id.* at ¶¶ 11–15.

1 My Daily Choice's terms also have modification, choice-of-law, and forum-selection  
2 clauses. From November 2014 to October 2018, My Daily Choice specified that its terms and  
3 conditions would be "construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas" and that  
4 "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the business relationships" between the  
5 company and its affiliates "shall be resolved by mandatory, final, binding[,] nonappealable [sic]  
6 arbitration in Dallas, Texas, United States of America."<sup>9</sup> That 2014 agreement contained a broad  
7 modification clause, reserving the company's "right to make any modifications" to the terms,  
8 "provided that the modifications are communicated" to affiliates "at least thirty [] days prior to  
9 taking effect."<sup>10</sup> In 2018, My Daily Choice altered these provisions. Among other things, it  
10 rendered its modification provision more circumspect, specifying that "[a]mendments shall not  
11 apply retroactively."<sup>11</sup> And it noted that "[j]urisdiction and venue of any matter not subject to  
12 arbitration shall reside exclusively in Clark County, State of Nevada."<sup>12</sup>

13 The Butlers, Donnell, Lambert, and the Lituskis became affiliates with My Daily Choice  
14 under the 2014 agreement, and Jackson joined when the 2018 agreement was in place.<sup>13</sup> But  
15 even the 2014-agreement affiliates consented to be bound by the 2018 agreement through a  
16 popup window on My Daily Choice's website.<sup>14</sup> That popup notified the defendants of new  
17 disclaimers for the program; provided a hyperlink for the company's policies and procedures;

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19 <sup>9</sup> *Butler*, ECF Nos. 23 at 4; 23-1 at 24.

20 <sup>10</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 23-5 at 19.

21 <sup>11</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 23-6 at 8.

22 <sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 52.

23 <sup>13</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 24-1 at ¶ 10; *Donnell*, ECF No. 15-1 at ¶ 8; *Lambert*, ECF No. 18-1 at ¶ 8;  
*Lituski*, ECF No. 12-1 at ¶ 3; *Jackson*, ECF No. 5 at 2.

<sup>14</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 24-1 at ¶ 12–14; *Donnell*, ECF No. 15-1 at ¶ 10; *Lambert*, ECF No. 18-1 at  
¶ 10; *Lituski*, ECF No. 12-1 at ¶ 10; *Jackson*, ECF No. 5 at 2.

1 and, in a blue box with white text directly beneath that hyperlink, required users to click a button  
 2 acknowledging that they “[u]nderstand and [a]gree to these [p]olicies and [p]rocedures.”<sup>15</sup> The  
 3 popup did not block affiliates from accessing their accounts; even if affiliates ignored the popup  
 4 or failed to agree to the terms and conditions, they could still use their accounts and would  
 5 continue to receive payments from My Daily Choice for their direct sales.<sup>16</sup> But the parties  
 6 dispute whether the popup impeded managing affiliates’ ability to receive a percentage of their  
 7 downline affiliates’ sales—revenue that ostensibly could be recouped for years.

8 Despite having profitable relationships with My Daily Choice, the defendants decided to  
 9 sever ties with the company and start their own venture.<sup>17</sup> In 2020, the Butlers formed Arieyl, a  
 10 competing direct-sales company that marketed products resembling those produced by My Daily  
 11 Choice.<sup>18</sup> They started with a 25-person team, which included former My Daily Choice affiliates  
 12 Donnell, Lambert, Jackson, and the Lituskis, and they all promoted Arieyl on social-media pages  
 13 that they had previously dedicated to selling My Daily Choice’s merchandise.<sup>19</sup> The Butlers also  
 14 used My Daily Choice’s compensation structure as source material for their own business.<sup>20</sup> So  
 15 My Daily Choice sued the defendants in this court. It asserts that all defendants breached their  
 16 agreements with the company and committed tortious interference with their contracts, while  
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19 <sup>15</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 24-6 at 2.

20 <sup>16</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 24-10 at ¶¶ 5–6.

21 <sup>17</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 27, 33; *Donnell*, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16; *Lambert*, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16;  
*Lituski*, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 19; *Jackson*, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16.

22 <sup>18</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 27-28.

23 <sup>19</sup> *Id.* at ¶¶ 28–29, 31, 34, 35; *Donnell*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 14, 18; *Lambert*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 16, 18,  
 25; *Lituski*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 20–23; *Jackson*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 17–20.

<sup>20</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 36–39.

separately alleging that the Butlers infringed on My Daily Choice’s copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 501 and that Lambert committed fraud.

### Discussion

#### I. Subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims against Jackson

“Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in doubt.”<sup>21</sup> District courts have limited, original jurisdiction over all civil actions: (1) “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States;”<sup>22</sup> and (2) “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of \$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”<sup>23</sup> When a defendant challenges subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the court will construe her motion as either “factual” or “facial.”<sup>24</sup> A factual challenge argues that the facts in the case, notwithstanding the allegations in the complaint, divest the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.<sup>25</sup> A facial challenge attacks the sufficiency of the allegations and mirrors a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which requires courts to take all allegations contained in the pleading as true and to “draw all reasonable inference in [plaintiff’s] favor.”<sup>26</sup> Generally, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject-matter jurisdiction exists.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009); *see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.*, 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[Courts] have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”).

<sup>22</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

<sup>23</sup> *Id.* § 1332(a)(1).

<sup>24</sup> *Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer*, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

<sup>25</sup> *White v. Lee*, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).

<sup>26</sup> *Wolfe v. Strankman*, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).

<sup>27</sup> *Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp.*, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).

1 Jackson’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion lodges both facial and factual challenges, arguing that  
 2 while the parties are diverse, My Daily Choice seeks disgorgement of previous commissions and  
 3 bonuses paid to Jackson, which amount to damages well below the statutory threshold.<sup>28</sup> The  
 4 company asserts that its projected losses will eventually exceed \$75,000 and seeks jurisdictional  
 5 discovery to uncover Jackson’s alleged misdeeds.<sup>29</sup> Generally, “[t]he amount in controversy  
 6 alleged by the proponent of federal jurisdiction—typically the plaintiff in the substantive  
 7 dispute—controls so long as the claim is made in good faith.”<sup>30</sup> “To justify dismissal, it must  
 8 appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.”<sup>31</sup>

9 My Daily Choice fails to allege damages exceeding \$75,000. While the amount in  
 10 controversy “is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute,”<sup>32</sup> should a defendant present  
 11 extra-pleading materials contradicting the substance of a complaint’s jurisdictional allegations, a  
 12 plaintiff must present “affidavits or any other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of  
 13 establishing” subject-matter jurisdiction.<sup>33</sup> Despite implying that it might be owed lost profits in  
 14 its response, My Daily Choice neither argues that its substantive claims justify such an award nor

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15 <sup>28</sup> *Jackson*, ECF No. 5 at 4.

16 <sup>29</sup> *Jackson*, ECF No. 7 at 3–4.

17 <sup>30</sup> *Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka*, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010).

18 <sup>31</sup> *Crum v. Circus Circus Enters.*, 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks  
 19 omitted); *see also St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.*, 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938)  
 20 (“It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount  
 to justify dismissal.”).

21 <sup>32</sup> *Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott*, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and  
 citations omitted).

22 <sup>33</sup> *St. Clair v. City of Chico*, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989); *see also La Reunion Francaise*  
 23 *SA v. Barnes*, 247 F.3d 1022, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“*St. Clair* held that a plaintiff bears this  
 burden of production *after* a defendant challenges the facts underlying the jurisdictional  
 allegations in a complaint based on evidence outside the pleadings. Only at that point does the  
 burden shift to the plaintiff to produce extrinsic evidence.”).

1 does it concretely identify what those lost profits might be. Its complaint explicitly seeks only  
 2 the “recovery of [My Daily Choice] commissions and bonuses paid to Jackson during the course  
 3 of her unlawful conduct,” “actual damages,” and disgorgement of “profits and gains derived as a  
 4 result of the unlawful acts.”<sup>34</sup> Jackson has liberally tallied those damages, which account for less  
 5 than \$50,000—a number My Daily Choice does not dispute. The company also provides no  
 6 articulated basis for what, exactly, jurisdictional discovery might uncover about its damages.<sup>35</sup>  
 7 Given that Jackson has demonstrated that, at most, My Daily Choice’s claim is for less than the  
 8 jurisdictional amount, and the company has failed to rebut that evidence, I find that this court  
 9 lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the company’s claims against Jackson and that  
 10 jurisdictional discovery would be fruitless. So I dismiss the suit against Jackson without  
 11 prejudice and without leave to amend.

## 12 **II. Personal jurisdiction over Ariejl, the Butlers, Donnell, Lambert, and the Lituskis**

13 A district court may dismiss an action under Federal Rules 12(b)(2) and (3) for lack of  
 14 personal jurisdiction or improper venue. The Fourteenth Amendment limits a forum state’s  
 15 power “to bind [] nonresident defendants,” like those here, “to a judgment of its courts.”<sup>36</sup> To  
 16 determine its jurisdictional reach, the court applies the forum state’s laws to determine personal  
 17 jurisdiction, bearing in mind that the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with the requirements  
 18 of due process under the United States Constitution.<sup>37</sup> The jurisdictional analyses under state  
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20 <sup>34</sup> *Jackson*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 33–37.

21 <sup>35</sup> *Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank*, 49 F.3d 555, 562 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Where a [p]laintiff’s claim  
 22 of personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and based on bare allegations in the face of  
 specific denials made by defendants, the Court need not permit even limited discovery.”).

23 <sup>36</sup> *Walden v. Fiore*, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (citing *World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson*,  
 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)).

<sup>37</sup> *Id.*



1 law and federal due process are identical in Nevada,<sup>38</sup> requiring “minimum contacts with [the  
 2 state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and  
 3 substantial justice.’”<sup>39</sup> “There are two forms of personal jurisdiction that a forum state may  
 4 exercise over a nonresident defendant—general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.”<sup>40</sup> While  
 5 courts must take “uncontroverted allegations in the complaint” as true, resolving conflicts in the  
 6 plaintiff’s favor, “disputed allegations in the complaint that are not supported with evidence or  
 7 affidavits cannot establish jurisdiction.”<sup>41</sup>

8 **A. This court lacks specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants.**

9 My Daily Choice does not claim that general jurisdiction exists in this court<sup>42</sup> and only  
 10 half-heartedly urges the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Arieyl, the Butlers, Donnell,  
 11 Lambert, and the Lituskis, arguing that they “engaged in a deliberate attempt to cause harm in  
 12 the forum and individually target[ed]” the company in Nevada.<sup>43</sup> A court may exercise specific  
 13 jurisdiction over a defendant if the cause of action “arises out of” or has a substantial connection  
 14 to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.<sup>44</sup> “The inquiry whether a forum State may assert  
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16 <sup>38</sup> *Id.*; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 14.065.

17 <sup>39</sup> *Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting *Milliken v. Meyer*, 311 U.S.  
 457, 463 (1940)).

18 <sup>40</sup> *Boschetto v. Hansing*, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008).

19 <sup>41</sup> *AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat*, 970 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing *Schwarzenegger*  
*v. Fred Martin Motor Co.*, 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004)).

20 <sup>42</sup> Because My Daily Choice concedes that general jurisdiction does not exist in this court, I  
 consider only whether this court may exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendants.

21 <sup>43</sup> *See, e.g., Butler*, ECF No. 24 at 15.

22 <sup>44</sup> *Hanson v. Denckla*, 357 U.S. 235, 250–53 (1958); *see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires*  
*Operations, S.A. v. Brown*, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand,  
 23 depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ principally,  
 activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s  
 regulation.”) (alteration in original).

specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ‘focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’”<sup>45</sup> In the Ninth Circuit, three requirements must be met for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: “(1) the non-resident defendant must” “perform some act by which [it] purposefully avails [itself] of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”; (2) the claim “arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities”; and (3) “the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.”<sup>46</sup> The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs; if it does so, the burden then shifts to the defendants to set forth a “compelling case” that the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable.<sup>47</sup>

My Daily Choice has failed to demonstrate that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of doing business in Nevada<sup>48</sup> or that its claims arise out of or relate to the defendants’ forum-related activities. “[T]he plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.”<sup>49</sup> The Ninth Circuit has long held that “a contract alone does not automatically establish minimum contacts,”<sup>50</sup> and the foreseeability of causing harm in the forum state, without more, is insufficient for purposeful availment.<sup>51</sup> As the Supreme Court

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<sup>45</sup> *Walden*, 571 U.S. at 283–84 (quoting *Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.*, 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984)).

<sup>46</sup> *Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law Grp.*, 905 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2018).

<sup>47</sup> *CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc.*, 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

<sup>48</sup> Because this dispute sounds in contract, I apply the purposeful-availment analysis. *Schwarzenegger*, 374 F.3d at 802.

<sup>49</sup> *Walden*, 571 U.S. at 285 (citing *Burger King Corp.*, 471 U.S. at 478)).

<sup>50</sup> *Boschetto*, 539 F.3d at 1017.

<sup>51</sup> *Holland Am. Line, Inc.*, 485 F.3d at 459.

clarified in *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County*, to satisfy the second prong of the specific-jurisdiction analysis, “there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’”<sup>52</sup> Under the clear terms of the 2014 agreement, the parties negotiated their initial contract in Texas, and there are no allegations that any of the defendants—each of whom reside in, operate out of, or are incorporated in Florida or Pennsylvania<sup>53</sup>—acted in such a way as to reach Nevada. My Daily Choice does not allege that Arieyl targets Nevada customers, much less indicate how the defendants have directed their conduct to the state or sought its protections and benefits. The company’s complaints, in fact, reveal that the only connection to Nevada is its own operation in the state. So I decline to exercise specific jurisdiction over Arieyl, the Butlers, Donnell, Lambert, or the Lituskis.

#### **B. Enforcement of the forum-selection clause**

Conceding that they’ve agreed to a forum-selection clause that governs this dispute,<sup>54</sup> Arieyl, the Butlers, Donnell, Lambert, and the Lituskis challenge whether that clause—which My Daily Choice changed from designating Texas to Nevada in a unilateral 2018 update to the parties’ agreement—is enforceable, such as to grant this court personal jurisdiction over them. A

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<sup>52</sup> *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty.*, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).

<sup>53</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 4–6; *Donnell*, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 4; *Lambert*, ECF No. 1 at ¶ 4; *Lituski*, ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 4–5.

<sup>54</sup> The parties appear to agree on this point, despite the updated 2018 terms stating that “any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration. The [p]arties waive all rights to trial by jury or to any court.” *Butler*, ECF No. 23-6 at 50–51. The defendants have not sought to enforce this arbitration provision.

1 defendant may consent to personal jurisdiction by agreeing to a forum-selection clause.<sup>55</sup>  
 2 Federal law governs the scope and enforcement of forum-selection clauses.<sup>56</sup> The Supreme  
 3 Court has established a robust “policy in favor of the enforcement of forum[-]selection  
 4 clauses.”<sup>57</sup> And a forum-selection clause is considered presumptively valid “absent a strong  
 5 showing that it should be set aside.”<sup>58</sup> The Ninth Circuit, drawing on the Supreme Court’s  
 6 decision in *MS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.*, has identified four scenarios that might  
 7 overcome this presumption of enforceability: (1) when enforcement would be unreasonable or  
 8 unjust; (2) when the clause is a “product of fraud or overreaching,” (3) when “the party wishing  
 9 to repudiate the clause would effectively be deprived of his day in court were the clause  
 10 enforced,” or (4) when enforcement would violate a “strong public policy” of the forum state.<sup>59</sup>  
 11 The defendants argue that the 2018 agreement should be set aside under the first two scenarios.

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15 <sup>55</sup> *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985); *Holland Am. Line Inc. v.*  
 16 *Wartsila N. Am., Inc.*, 485 F.3d 450, 458 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[U]nder general contract principles, a  
 forum[-]selection clause may give rise to waiver of objections to personal jurisdiction, provided  
 that the defendant agrees to be so bound.”).

17 <sup>56</sup> *Manetti-Farro, Inc. v. Gucci Am. Inc.*, 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988). In resolving a  
 18 motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(2) and (3), a court may “consider facts outside the  
 pleadings.” *Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A.*, 87 F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1996). Parties on both  
 19 sides of the aisle ask me to consider both the 2014 and 2018 agreements.

20 <sup>57</sup> *E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A.*, 446 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2006); *Atl. Marine*  
*Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Tex.*, 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013) (“[Such clauses]  
 should be given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.”).

21 <sup>58</sup> *MS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.*, 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (“There are compelling reasons  
 22 why a freely negotiated private internal agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or  
 overweening bargaining power, such as that involved here, should be given full effect.”); *Gemini*  
*Techs., Inc. v. Smith & Wesson Corp.*, 931 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2019).

23 <sup>59</sup> *Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l Inc.*, 362 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks  
 and citations omitted); see also *Petersen v. Boeing Co.*, 715 F.3d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 2013).

1                   ***1. The 2018 agreement is neither unreasonable nor unjust.***

2                   The defendants assert that enforcement of the 2018 agreement would be unjust because  
 3 they lacked sufficient notice of the terms, failed to read them, and because the agreement was  
 4 unilaterally imposed upon them and contains unconscionable provisions. The principles of  
 5 contract still apply to commerce conducted on the Internet.<sup>60</sup> Online agreements, like My Daily  
 6 Choice’s, generally come in three varieties: browsewrap, clickwrap, and hybrid.<sup>61</sup> Browsewrap  
 7 agreements, which are infrequently enforced, do not require a user “to manifest assent to the  
 8 terms and conditions expressly;” the mere act of “using the website” is taken as consent.<sup>62</sup>  
 9 Clickwrap agreements, which are often enforced, require a user to “click on an ‘I agree’ box after  
 10 being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use.”<sup>63</sup> Hybrid agreements meld aspects of  
 11 both, often “notif[ying] the user of the existence of the website’s terms of use” via a hyperlink,  
 12 requiring a user to click “I agree,” or merely “advis[ing] the user that he or she is agreeing to the  
 13 terms of service when registering or signing up” with the company.<sup>64</sup> The enforceability of each

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19 <sup>60</sup> *Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc.*, 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014).

20 <sup>61</sup> *Id.*

21 <sup>62</sup> *Id.* at 1175–76.

22 <sup>63</sup> *Id.*; *Fteja v. Facebook, Inc.*, 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that a “pure-form clickwrap agreement” contains a “mechanism that forces the user to actually examine the terms before assenting.”).

23 <sup>64</sup> *Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc.*, 868 F.3d 66, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2017); *Peter v. Doordash, Inc.*, 445 F. Supp. 3d 580, 585–86 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (noting this hybrid approach and finding that an arbitration agreement was enforceable).

1 type of agreement turns on whether a user had actual or constructive notice of the terms,  
2 sufficient to demonstrate mutual assent to its conditions.<sup>65</sup>

3 My Daily Choice’s 2018 agreement is an enforceable, hybrid agreement. Courts  
4 throughout this circuit have consistently enforced agreements presented to users as clear,  
5 hyperlinked terms located near a required “I agree” button, despite the agreement being imposed  
6 unilaterally on the user and the user not actually reading the terms.<sup>66</sup> For example, in *Rodriguez*  
7 *v. Experian Services Corp.*, the court enforced an arbitration clause hyperlinked on a website,  
8 which included an express disclosure and agreement stating “[b]y clicking the button above . . .  
9 you agree to our [t]erms of [u]se.”<sup>67</sup> So too in *Crawford v. Beachbody, LLC*, where a judge  
10 enforced a forum-selection clause contained within terms and conditions of a website when, at  
11 the final page of placing an order, the plaintiff click a button stating “[p]lace [o]rder,” near  
12 language stating “by clicking [p]lace [o]rder below, you are agreeing” to the hyperlinked terms  
13 and conditions.<sup>68</sup> Like the *Rodriguez* and *Crawford* agreements, My Daily Choice’s terms were  
14 presented as a clear hyperlink near an “I understand and agree to these policies and procedures”  
15 button.<sup>69</sup> And the undisputed evidence shows that the defendants clicked that button.<sup>70</sup>

16 Nor am I persuaded that the unilateral imposition of the 2018 agreement, which includes  
17 a modification provision, makes it illusory and unenforceable. Disparate bargaining power  
18 between parties, coupled with the inability to negotiate the agreement, is generally insufficient to  
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20 <sup>65</sup> *Nguyen*, 763 F.3d at 1175–76.

21 <sup>66</sup> *See, e.g., Nevarez v. Forty Niners Football Co., LLC*, 2017 WL 3492110, at \*8 (N.D. Cal.  
2017).

22 <sup>67</sup> *Rodriguez v. Experian Serv. Corp.*, 2015 WL 12656919, at \*2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2015).

23 <sup>68</sup> *Crawford v. Beachbody, LLC*, 2014 WL 6606563, at \*2–\*3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014).

<sup>69</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 24-7 at 1.

<sup>70</sup> *See, e.g., Butler*, ECF Nos. 24-3–9.

1 invalidate a contract.<sup>71</sup> And while unilateral modification provisions have been deemed  
 2 substantively unconscionable in certain circumstances,<sup>72</sup> courts have upheld modification  
 3 provisions like the one at issue here when the party has notice of the provision and any proposed  
 4 modification does not operate retroactively.<sup>73</sup> Regardless, the defendants have failed to explain  
 5 why the inclusion of that modification provision necessarily requires rejection of the entire  
 6 agreement or the forum-selection clause, as opposed to severance of the offending provision. So  
 7 I find that the 2018 agreement’s forum-selection clause is neither unreasonable nor unjust and  
 8 decline to set it aside on this basis.

9 **2. *It is unclear whether the clause is the product of duress.***

10 The defendants also hope to set aside the forum-selection clause by arguing that the entire  
 11 2018 agreement was the product of economic duress. “[S]imply alleging that one was duped  
 12 into signing the contract is not enough”; “[f]or a party to escape a forum[-]selection clause on the  
 13 grounds of fraud, it must show that ‘the inclusion of that clause in the contract was the product of  
 14 fraud or coercion.’”<sup>74</sup> Multiple courts have rejected the contention that a forum-selection clause  
 15 was the product of fraud, coercion, or overreaching because the arguments went “to the contract  
 16 as a whole,” and not the inclusion of the clause itself.<sup>75</sup> But I am not aware of a Ninth Circuit

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 18 <sup>71</sup> *Murphy*, 362 F.3d at 1141.

19 <sup>72</sup> See, e.g., *In re Zappos.com, Inc. v. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058,  
 1062 (D. Nev. 2012) (invalidating modification provision contained in browsewrap agreement  
 that affected both pending and anticipated suits); *Crawford*, 2014 WL 6606563, at \*3.

20 <sup>73</sup> *Ekin v. Amazon Servs., LLC*, 84 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1176 (W.D. Wash. 2014); *Reno v. W. Cab*  
*Co.*, 2020 WL 5606897, at \*3 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2020).

21 <sup>74</sup> *Richards v. Lloyd’s of London*, 135 F.3d 1289, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Scherk v.*  
 22 *Alberto-Culver Co.*, 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974)); *Batchelder v. Nobuhiko Kawamoto*, 147  
 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1998).

23 <sup>75</sup> *LaCross v. Knight Transp., Inc.*, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2015); see also *S. Cal.*  
*Fleet Servs., Inc. v. ADP Dealer Servs., Inc.*, 2013 WL 1400950, at \*4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2008)  
 (“So Cal Fleet makes no attempt to show that the clause itself was fraudulently included in the

1 case addressing whether a federal court may consider unconscionability of a contract as a whole  
 2 under state law when the contract contains a forum-selection clause, so as to resolve a personal-  
 3 jurisdiction challenge. So I provisionally consider the argument that the 2018 agreement is  
 4 unconscionable under Nevada law, thus depriving this court of jurisdiction over the defendants.

5 Nevada law on economic duress is sparse.<sup>76</sup> But Nevada often looks to California for  
 6 guidance on principles of contract,<sup>77</sup> whose courts have invalidated agreements that are the  
 7 product of fraud or coercion.<sup>78</sup> In the Ninth Circuit, interpreting California law, “economic  
 8 duress can excuse an innocent party’s contractual obligations when the other contracting party  
 9 does ‘a wrongful act [that] is sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonably prudent person faced  
 10 with no reasonable alternative to succumb to the perpetrator’s pressure.’”<sup>79</sup> To establish  
 11 economic duress, a plaintiff must show (1) a sufficiently coercive, wrongful act on the part of the  
 12 defendant; (2) no reasonable alternative on the part of the plaintiff; (3) knowledge of the  
 13 plaintiff’s economic vulnerability; and (4) actual inducement to contract.<sup>80</sup> Courts have held that  
 14 the absence of reasonable alternatives “may exist ‘when the only other alternative is bankruptcy  
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18 agreement, and claims only that its consent to enter into the entire agreement was the product of  
 19 fraud. This allegation is insufficient . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); *Roberts C.R. England, Inc.*,  
 20 827 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s contention because it  
 21 “goes to the contract as a whole and is not specific to the forum selection clause.”).

22 <sup>76</sup> *Braun v. Nevada Land, LLC*, No. 57434, 2013 WL 461254, at \*2 (Nev. Feb. 5, 2013)  
 23 (recognizing an economic-duress defense to contract formation) (unpublished).

<sup>77</sup> *Taylor v. State Indus. Ins. Sys.*, 816 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Nev. 1991).

<sup>78</sup> *Rich v. Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc.*, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1159 (1984).

<sup>79</sup> *Id.*

<sup>80</sup> *Hicks*, 897 F.3d at 1119; *Tanner v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.*, 2016 WL 4076116, at \*4  
 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016).



1 or financial ruin,”<sup>81</sup> the party demonstrates “dire economic conditions,”<sup>82</sup> or the enforcing party  
 2 threatens termination of critical health benefits.<sup>83</sup>

3 Based on the record presented, it is unclear whether My Daily Choice coerced the  
 4 defendants to approve the 2018 agreement or that the inclusion of the forum-selection clause was  
 5 the product of duress. Construing factual disputes in My Daily Choice’s favor, as I must, it  
 6 appears that the company did not (1) make continued receipt of direct-sales revenue contingent  
 7 upon agreement to the forum-selection clause or (2) limit access to the defendants’ accounts.<sup>84</sup>  
 8 But it is unclear whether the company halted payment of the defendants’ downline-affiliate’s  
 9 sales percentages and the extent to which withholding that income might constitute a dire  
 10 financial condition. This may be because the defendants raise those arguments for the first time  
 11 in reply.<sup>85</sup> While I am inclined not to find economic duress here, I direct My Daily Choice,  
 12 Arieyl, the Butlers, Donnell, Lambert, and the Lituskis to appear for an evidentiary hearing on  
 13 the matter.<sup>86</sup> They should be prepared to (1) offer authority on whether federal law permits  
 14 setting aside an unconscionable agreement under a theory of economic duress; (2) discuss  
 15 whether federal law requires the defendants to exclusively challenge the coercive inclusion of the  
 16 forum-selection clause, and not the entire contract; and (3) provide evidence of the extent of the  
 17 company’s financial coercion.

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 20 <sup>81</sup> *Hicks*, 897 F.3d at 1119 (quoting *Rich*, 157 Cal. App. at 1159).

21 <sup>82</sup> *United States v. Singulex, Inc.*, 2019 WL 1981192, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2019).

22 <sup>83</sup> *Doe I v. Morrison & Foerster LLP*, 2019 WL 11806485, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2019).

23 <sup>84</sup> *Butler*, ECF No. 24-10 at ¶¶ 4–6.

<sup>85</sup> See, e.g., *Butler*, ECF Nos. 29; 29-1 at ¶¶ 3–5.

<sup>86</sup> I follow the guidance of the *Petersen v. Boeing Co.* court, which recommended holding an evidentiary hearing to resolve issues of economic duress or coercion. *Petersen*, 725 F.3d at 283.

### 1 **III. Consolidation**

2 Federal Rule 42(a) and this district's Local Rule 42-1(b) authorize courts to consolidate  
 3 related cases, either sua sponte or upon motion, when those cases involve a common question of  
 4 law or fact. A court has broad discretion under Rule 42 when determining whether to  
 5 consolidate actions pending in the same district.<sup>87</sup> If the court determines that common  
 6 questions are present, it must then balance the savings of time and effort that consolidation will  
 7 produce against any inconvenience, delay, confusion, or prejudice that may result.<sup>88</sup> My Daily  
 8 Choice's suit against these defendants all revolve around the same allegations: the Butlers  
 9 enrolled the Lituskis, Donnell, Lambert, and the now-dismissed Jackson to launch Arieyl, in  
 10 violation of those defendants' agreements with the company. It also sues the defendants for  
 11 largely identical claims. There is little doubt that consolidation would greatly save time and  
 12 litigation expenses. But given that My Daily Choice seems to have separately filed these  
 13 lawsuits for a reason, and no party has moved for consolidation, I order the parties to attend a  
 14 hearing to discuss whether consolidation might result in unanticipated inconvenience, delay,  
 15 confusion, or prejudice.

### 16 **Conclusion**


17 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Erin Jackson's motion to dismiss [ECF No. 5] in  
 18 **Case No. 2:20-cv-02237 is GRANTED.** That action is dismissed without prejudice and without  
 19 leave to amend for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. **The Clerk of Court is directed to**  
 20 **CLOSE that case.**

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23 <sup>87</sup> *Inv'rs Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal.*, 877 F.2d 777, 777 (9th Cir. 1989).

<sup>88</sup> *Huene v. United States*, 743 F.2d 703, 704 (9th Cir. 1984)).

1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that My Daily Choice, Arieyl, William Butler, Kristen  
2 Butler, Marissa Donnell, Skylar Lambert, Danielle Lituski, and Chad Lituski must **appear for a**  
3 **hearing in Courtroom 6D of the Lloyd D. George Courthouse at 333 Las Vegas Blvd. So., at**  
4 **1:30 p.m. on August 26, 2021**, prepared to discuss (1) the legal and factual issues about  
5 economic duress levied in connection with My Daily Choice's 2018 agreement and (2)  
6 consolidation of this matter.

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U.S. District Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey  
Dated: August 6, 2021